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ABSTRACT 
In a post-9/11 world, cooperation among first-responders in New York City is absolutely 
essential for maintaining public safety. Although more than a decade has passed since 9/
11, inter-agency communication between the New York City Police Department (NYPD) 
and the Fire Department of New York (FDNY) is still far from perfect.  This paper 
examines the inter-agency cooperation changes made since 9/11, not only between the 
NYPD and the FDNY, but all agencies in state of New York charged with public safety. I 
also consider which approaches have worked to foster inter-agency cooperation, 
including the use of fusion centers, central agencies charged with coordinating 
emergency responses (such as the New York City Office of Emergency Management), 
and structured protocols like the Citywide Incident Management System that clearly 
delineate the roll of each agency at the scene of an emergency. Finally, I examine 
potential approaches that have not been implemented but could prove fruitful, and I make 
recommendations on what approaches should be taken in order to foster greater inter-
agency cooperation.  
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There are many issues facing law enforcement today, and communications remain 
particularly problematic even as technology advances. Interoperable communications 
systems allow for tactical and situational communications, and collaborative effort 
requires communication on a regular basis and on an interpersonal level. At present, there 
is a gap in communications between the largest public safety agencies in New York City.  
The New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the New York City Fire 
Department (FDNY) respond to thousands of emergency and non-emergency runs 
together each year, but there are no incident level communications for first responders 
and front line supervisors to employ on a regular basis other than informal, on scene, ad 
hoc conferrals. These exchanges are dependent on the actual supervisors present and are 
not consistently employed, and at times, they may not occur at all. Information that 
would best serve those with “boots on the ground” travels up one chain of command 
before coming down the other to enable two onsite supervisors to act together. Such is the 
exchange of information under the present Citywide Incident Management System 
(CIMS). Collaborative effort at that level is hindered by the lack of a sustained working 
communications capability. 
Beyond this, there is no established conduit to guide the flow of actionable 
intelligence, strategic, and tactical information, and observations of criminal and terrorist 
activity with regularity or certainty. The lack of a notification process, the absence of a 
reporting obligation, and the inadequacy of cross training place the individual agency’s 
priorities at the fore and leave collaborative effort a very distant second. 
The present literature in the field places little importance on the need to improve 
communications at the first responder level. In an effort to bridge this gap, relying on 
experience and research, proposals to remedy these situations are presented. Comparative 
reviews of successfully implemented cross-agency communications in other jurisdictions 
offer some insight. More importantly, relying on a fusion center model of proximity, 
 xiii 
regular interface and the reciprocal exchange of information between police officers and 
firefighters needs to be of paramount importance.  
Ancillary organizations in private security, government, and related concerns 
have profited from such public-private consortiums developed to disseminate important 
information in a timely manner, so, too, should our own public safety agencies confer, 
with success measured in efficiency and profits measured in lives saved. 
Finally, the recommendations presented are grounded in best practices with an 
eye toward proactive communications between agencies whose rivalry may have 
hindered such exchanges in the past. Collaborative efforts on the part of both agencies are 
recommended, which would engender a more collegial exchange of information and a 
obligating each agency to follow the admonitions of the 9/11 Commission1 and realize 
the “need to share” trumps the “need to know.” The concluding recommendations of this 
thesis provide clear goals and structure to improve the interagency communication and 




1Thomas Kean et al., "9/11 Commission Report Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States Executive Summary," 9/11 Commission Report Executive Summary, July 
22, 2004,  24, accessed August 20, 2014, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.pdf. 
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I. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
One of the major problems facing law enforcement agencies today, including the 
New York City Police Department (NYPD), is the lack of communication and 
collaboration between first-responding agencies, which potentially puts the lives of 
citizens at risk. This problem becomes apparent as agencies try to address “everyday” 
public safety issues, and it has become particularly notable as these agencies attempt to 
combat terrorism. Although there is some communication and information sharing 
between agencies, there remains a critical need for improvement. 
The NYPD, as well as the Fire Department of New York (FDNY), must improve 
inter-agency planning and coordination if they are to fulfill their missions to protect the 
citizens of New York City.1 This became particularly clear on September 11, 2001. On 
that day, the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by a 
terrorist organization. Among the locations targeted were New York City’s World Trade 
Center and Washington DC’s Pentagon Building, although the bulk of devastation 
occurred in New York (the Twin Towers’ steel structure was compromised, which caused 
them to collapse).  
The heroic actions of all first responders, both civilian and professional, helped 
save thousands of lives. A review of their response was initiated by the National 
Commission for the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission) to 
determine if any mistakes made by federal agencies, if avoided, could have prevented the 
attack, as well as to distinguish any areas of incident management that required 
improvement.2 Although the majority of the commission’s report highlights the lack of 
coordination and shortcomings of the federal agencies, there is a chapter dedicated to the 
efforts of the first responders. This chapter contrasts the response at the World Trade 
1 Mckinsey and Company, Improving NYPD Preparedness and Response, 2002, accessed January 2, 
2012, http://209.172.180.99/locations/madrid/pdfs/nypdemergency.pdf. 
2 National Commission for the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Heroism and Horror,” in 
Final Report of the National Commission for the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 314.  
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Center site versus the Pentagon site.3 The report by the 9/11 Commission provides 
valuable insight regarding internal issues associated with not only civilian response but 
the response of the NYPD, the FDNY, the New York City Emergency Medical Service 
(EMS), and the Port Authority Police Department (PAPD). 
The primary issue the commission brought to the attention of first responders is a 
lack of coordination and communication among the departments, particularly the NYPD 
and FDNY. Interagency communication is improving with the introduction of 
interoperable radios and joint exercises with still a long way to go. While the 9/11 
Commission report is over a decade old, some of these same complaints still exist today 
and are noted in several of the works examined in this paper’s literature review. It is 
important to note that prior to this tragedy, the NYPD and FDNY worked independently 
of one another; therefore, response strategies within each department were varied and 
often conflicted. After the attack, both agencies responded to the target site as expected 
with the same goal: secure the safety of as many individuals as possible. With these 
instructions, thousands of NYPD and FDNY members responded to the scene and were 
present as the towers fell. As a result of the large number of first responders present, it 
came as no surprise that these agencies both suffered severe casualties. In addition to the 
almost 3,000 civilians that died, the FDNY lost 343 firefighters and the NYPD lost 23 
police officers.4 
Prior to September 11, 2001, the relationship between the NYPD and the FDNY 
had been contentious and remains so today nearly 13 years after the attacks. The proud 
histories of both departments combined with a human element (i.e., egos) can contribute 
to their autonomous mindset. Although the mission for both agencies is always saving 
lives, there are some core competencies performed by each agency that can lead to 
differences of opinion over who can best handle the emergency. Bravado and jealousy 
can sometimes get the best of the individuals on the ground. In addition, loyalty to one’s 
agency can create intense competition, even as these agencies work toward the same 
3 Ibid., 322. 
4 “911 by Numbers,” September 2014, New York Magazine, accessed July 18, 2014, 
http://nymag.com/news/articles/wtc/1year/numbers.htm. 
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goal. In 1988, then Mayor Ed Koch asked the fire and police commissioners to shake 
hands after they argued about which department had better scuba divers. That was just 
another step in breaking through the unnecessary animosity.5 
Another example of the still much-needed communication fix between the NYPD 
and the FDNY is an incident that occurred in April, 2012.6 A NYC window washer 
became stranded and required aid of city professionals for assistance. Unfortunately, this 
is not an uncommon occurrence in New York City. The NYPD Emergency Service Unit 
responded and worked to rescue the man by rappelling down from a Manhattan high-rise. 
The FDNY was also present on scene—responding to the 911 call—and were working 
from inside the building where the man was dangling.  
The communication problem began when the FDNY Battalion Chief used local 
media to air grievances on how this incident was handled, stating, “There was no need for 
NYPD ESU to perform the roof rescue.”7 The chief believed the FDNY was in charge 
and that the NYPD put their own officer’s life in danger. In response, the NYPD 
spokesperson stated that “high-angle rescues call for a unified command.”8 While the 
NYPD was working from the roof, the FDNY was working on the floor where the worker 
was stranded.9 Once again, the agencies were bickering over command control and 
operational tactics. The statements from the two departments provided reason for the 
public to doubt the ability of the two entities to cooperate. The stranded man was rescued, 
but more serious issues needed to be addressed. 
There are numerous anecdotal stories of members of the FDNY notifying the 
NYPD of suspicious activities with no evident response. Additionally, there are also 
5 Corey Adwar, “Why NYC Cops and Firefighters Keep Getting into Massive Brawls,” Business 
Insider, April 21, 2014, accessed September 25, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-nypd-and-fdny-
have-a-long-history-of-disputes-2014-4. 
6 Al Baker, “17 Floors Up, Rescue of 3 Shows Clash of Agencies,” The New York Times, April 13, 
2012, accessed September 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/14/nyregion/skyscraper-rescue-
shows-clash-of-ny-police-and-fire-depts.html?_r=3&ref=albaker&. 
7 Ben Yakas, “NYPD and FDNY Squabbled over Scaffolding Rescue,” Gothamist (blog), April 14, 
2012, accessed August 24, 2013, http://gothamist.com/2012/04/14/
nypd_and_fdny_squabbled_over_scaffo.php. 
8 Al Baker, “17 Floors Up.” 
9 Ibid.  
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occurrences where the FDNY received evidence of suspicious activity, but because of the 
current bureaucratic process, the information was not passed on to the NYPD for several 
days.  
One such incident involved suspicious males observing the FDNY response to an 
occurrence on the NYC subway system. After investigating an emergency call in the 
subway, the FDNY discovered the anonymous 911 call was unfounded. A firefighter at 
the scene observed two males carefully watching all activity and reported their conduct to 
his commanders. Although ultimately this may have been nothing more than curious 
tourists, the NYPD’s Intelligence Division was not made aware of these concerns for 
several days—thereby thwarting their mission and costing them an opportunity to 
investigate the individuals who may or may not have been reconnoitering the FDNY 
operational response.10  
If the NYPD had been made aware of the initial incident, it could have taken 
some preliminary investigative steps (e.g., get a description, possibly identify the 
individuals, note license plates of any vehicles they were traveling in, canvass for video 
cameras). The fire officer and NYPD supervisor should have made contact with each 
other and ensured the intelligence was investigated by the appropriate agency. Again, this 
case demonstrates a failure to communicate even in “high stakes” counterterrorism 
situations. 
The 9/11 Commission offered suggestions on ways to alleviate some of these 
issues. One of the recommendations for New York City was made after studying the 
response at the Pentagon, which is widely held as a better than the response in New York. 
The Pentagon used an incident command system that could strengthen an area’s response 
to a crisis.11 Part of this command system includes an incident management team in place 
for the National Capital Region of Washington, DC. The duties of this team include 
implementing procedures to alleviate problems in communication between federal, state, 
and local authorities as well as private sector jurisdictions. Although no system is without 
10 Bureau of Fire Investigations, “Suspicious Civilians Observing Subway False Alarm” (internal 
document, New York City, June 30, 2010). 
11 National Commission for the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Heroism and Horror,” 314. 
 4 
                                                 
flaws, the response to the attack at the Pentagon was considered to be generally 
effective.12  
As well as the need to improve cooperation at the scene of an event, the NYPD 
and the FDNY need to find ways to work together in programs designed to mitigate 
events before they occur. To accomplish this, the agencies need to develop ways for the 
precinct and firehouse level personnel to collaborate in an effective fashion on a regular 
basis. Mitigating threats before they occur requires analytical and problem solving skills. 
Public safety agencies need to institute joint training programs to develop such skills in 
their first responder and first line supervisory personnel. A culture of intelligence sharing 
and collaborative effort has since been prescribed for New York City by the commission 
as a necessary means of combating hazards that confront public safety agencies 
(generally) and law enforcement (specifically). Criminal intelligence and 
counterterrorism are reliant on the reported suspicions and observations of civilians and 
outside agencies. To this end, law enforcement must enhance communication with other 
first responders, especially the fire services and emergency medical services. The training 
of outside agencies to identify and report such circumstances is critical. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
How can the two major first responding agencies from New York City—the 
FDNY and the NYPD—collaborate more effectively? Can these agencies create a more 
effective mechanism for information and intelligence sharing to better protect the City of 
New York? To answer these questions, this thesis reviews the steps already taken by each 
agency to better share information and intelligence. It includes an analysis to reveal what 
communication gaps still remain. This is followed by recommendations for measures that 
could be adopted to ensure New York City’s information and intelligence sharing model 
is more effective in the future.  
This thesis explores the efforts that the NYPD, FDNY, and other municipal 
agencies have made in to collaborate with each other to keep New York City safe from a 
variety of harms. The character of many of these harms differ, but the models of 
12 Ibid., 322. 
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collaboration that have been developed to mitigate these harms may be “generalizable”— 
that is, they can be adapted to combat the terrorist threat that the city places a high 
priority on addressing. The first chapter reviews the NYPD’s attempts to “think outside 
the box” in its collaborative efforts, which are designed to try and break down some of 
the traditional “stove piping” barriers that municipal agencies erect. The second section 
takes the same approach with the programs the FDNY has initiated to work more 
collaboratively. The fire department has placed an increased emphasis on 
counterterrorism, and in recent years this has been reflected by new programs. The third 
chapter explores the history and role of the New York City Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM). It examines OEM’s role of ensuring collaboration and establishing 
the Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS). The thesis looks outside New York 
City and highlight collaborative efforts throughout New York State, including the State 
Fusion Center. Before the recommendations, a successful police/fire collaboration from 
another jurisdiction is analyzed. The thesis then provides several concrete 
recommendations for a more collaborative public safety model in New York City that is 
better constructed to mitigate terrorist threats and deeds. 
 
 6 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a distinct lack of literature on this subject matter of inter-agency 
communication partly because it was not a public sector priority before September 11, 
2001. The review of the existing literature for this thesis is broken into two main 
categories: governmental/scholarly publications and practitioner reports. The 
governmental/scholarly publications pertain to communication in the area of homeland 
security and examine various agencies and actors and their approach to collaboration. 
The practitioner reports are typically policy papers that make recommendations based on 
the author’s experiences.  
A. GOVERNMENTAL/SCHOLARLY PUBLICATIONS 
After the tragedy of September 11, literature detailing the different viewpoints of 
the event specifically regarding communication and collaboration has increased. 
Furthermore, the creation of the new governmental Department of Homeland Security 
provided insight to the need for intelligence sharing between both law enforcement 
agencies and the community. Much of what has been written highlights the necessity for 
improved communications within enforcement departments, such as the report by the 9/
11 Commission. There have also been documented accounts from the viewpoints of first 
responders, particularly firemen, regarding the necessary education of the intelligence 
process.13  
COPS Collaboration Toolkit is a government publication that explores the 
benefits of collaboration between community and law enforcement entities. It is an 
influential document—first responders rely on this resource in practice and refer to its 
content in their policy proposals. The toolkit tries to “provide a more systematic 
comprehensive approach to addressing emergencies.”14 The framework the toolkit 
13 Richard J. Baltus, “Altering the Mission Statement: Training of Firefighters as Intelligence Gathers” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School 2008), accessed May 11, 2013, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=235057. 
14 Tammy Rinehart, Anna Laszlo, and Gwen Briscoe, Collaboration Toolkit: How to Build, Fix, 
Sustain Productive Partnerships (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2001), accessed June 20, 2013, 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/html/cd_rom/collaboration_toolkit/pubs/collaborationtoolkit.pdf. 
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proposes is unique; it identifies nine components of a sucessful collaboration and makes 
an abstract concept (collaboration) attainable by informing the reader how to execute 
each component.  
Building Collaborative Capacity: An Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security 
Preparedness by Susan Hocevar, Eric Jansen, and Gail Fann Thomas, describes two 
different methods for building homeland security collaboration. The work highlights both 
positive and negative factors that affect inter-organizational collaboration. One of the 
concepts described is “social capital” or interpersonal relationships. According to the 
authors, “Social capital is the development of camaraderie/esprit de corps to carry the 
group through conflicts.”15 In addition, Hocevar, Jansen and Thomas observe issues 
surrounding the constantly changing environment of homeland security, where job-stay is 
always a looming question. They ask: “How will they [practitioners] keep their 
collaborative efforts going without losing momentum in times of change for political and 
other reasons?”16  
This observation emphasizes the consequences of political turnovers on 
employees of all first responder agencies. If there is a constant need to hire and train new 
employees, progress will never be possible as action will always be in the initial phase of 
collaboration. It is important that the “boots on the ground” build relationships that will 
be sustained beyond term limits. This is as relevant today as it was on September12, 
2001. As former Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly stated: “In two months we’ll 
hold a general election to determine the next Mayor. Whoever wins will carry the 
daunting responsibilities. Arguably the most important is to protect the city from another 
terrorist attack.”17  
15 Susan P. Hocevar, Erik Jansen, and Gail Fann-Thomas, “Building Collaborative Capacity: An 
Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness,” Advances in Interdisciplinary Studies of Work 
Teams, Vol. 12, ed. Michael Berertein, 255–274 (New York: Elsevier Ltd, 2006), https://calhoun.nps.edu/
bitstream/handle/10945/38475/inc_Hocevar_Thomas.pdf?sequence=1, 261.  
16 Ibid., 268. 
17 New York Police Department, “Remarks of Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly Before 




                                                 
In Firefighters Developing a Role in Counterterrorism, authored by Daveed 
Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, the authors suggest that firefighters should be 
integrated into counterterrorism efforts to alleviate demands that currently fall solely on 
local law enforcement using the volume of firefighting personnel to support their claim. 
According to the authors, of the 30,635 fire departments in the United States, 4,052 are 
career departments while 26,583 are mostly staffed by volunteers.18 Furthermore, the 
authors also posit that many of the core competencies firefighters now rely on while 
responding to fires (e.g., mitigating natural or man-made disasters) can also be applied 
and directed towards counterterrorism. According to the Gartenstein-Ross and Dabruzzi, 
“There are three broad ways in which a fire department can contribute to 
counterterrorism efforts: as intelligence collectors, users and sharers; as developers of 
community networks; and as organizers of joint planning, preparedness, and response.”19 
A specific area of concern and a common issue in programs that use firefighters as 
intelligence gatherers is to guard against the firefighters drifting into law enforcement 
activities; the work discusses ways to address this issue. 
Fusion centers serve as focal points within the state and local environment for the 
receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing threat-related information between the federal 
government and state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT), and private sector partners.20 They 
exist to support the response and recovery mission preparation and execution. A U.S. 
Department of Justice (Office of Justice Programs) report titled Fire Service Integration 
suggests fire service personnel should be involved in training exercises to help them 
understand the use of fusion centers.21 The authors of the report advocate that this 
integration will display the value of reporting suspicious activity and the benefits once 
18 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Kyle Dabruzzi, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in Counterterrorism,” 
Manhattan Institute, August 2008, accessed September 28, 2014, http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/
ptr_03.htm. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Centers and Emergency Operation Centers,” December 
19, 2013, accessed September 28, 2014, https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers-and-emergency-operations-
centers. 
21 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, Fire Service Integration for Fusion 
Centers: An Appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Areas Fusion Centers, April 
2010, accessed August 28, 2014, https://it.ojp.gov/docdownloader.aspx?ddid=1280, 13. 
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these reports are acted upon. The report also lists which actions fusion centers should be 
responsible for, such as information gathering, collection, and recognition of the 
precursors to terrorism. Moreover, it emphasizes the need for fusion centers to develop a 
method of reporting suspicious activity. This is also a key issue affecting the NYPD and 
the FDNY as they develop protocol for reporting suspicious activity. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD 5), issued February 28, 2003, 
directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and administer a National Incident 
Management System. This was developed to standardize responses by federal, state, and 
local governments to emergencies nationally regardless of size or complexity. A key 
component of this directive is “step # 20,” which mandated a system be in place if state 
and local governments wanted to be considered for federal preparedness assistance 
grants, contracts, or other activities.22 
New York City Mayoral Executive Order Number 61, dated April 11, 2005, 
implemented the Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS).23 In response to HSPD 
5, NYC developed CIMS to be in compliance with the national incident management 
system (NIMS).24 The new system mandated that the Office of Emergency Management 
(OEM) Commissioner be responsible for implementing the city’s protocol for responding 
to and recovering from emergencies incidents, and to ensure procedures are consistent 
with NIMS. Though CIMS places an emphasis on life-saving via joint operations, it has 
also contributed to the tension between the NYPD and the FDNY. This is because the 
CIMS protocols can be somewhat ambiguous at times when determining the lead agency 
in an incident (e.g., according to CIMS, sometimes the lead agency is the first one to 
arrive on the scene25). 
22 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 Management of Domestic 
Incidents (Washington, DC: White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2003). 
23 “NYC Executive Order #61 Citywide Incident Management System,” August 11, 2005, accessed 
February 20, 2013, http://www.nyc.gov/html/records/pdf/executive_orders/2005EO061.pdf. 
24 Ibid. 
25 New York City Office of Emergency Management, “Primary Agency Matrix,” October 26, 2014, 
accessed July 20, 2013, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/planning_response/cims_matrix.shtml. 
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B. PRACTITIONER REPORTS 
Jerome Hagen, a captain in the Seattle Fire Department, examines four disciplines 
within homeland security—law enforcement, public health, emergency management, and 
the fire services—in his CHDS thesis, “Interagency Collaboration Challenges Among 
Homeland Security Disciplines in Urban Areas.” He notes the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security requires all first responder disciplines to engage in efforts to prevent 
terrorism. In addition, Hagen discusses the lack of trust among officials throughout 
different jurisdictions as well as between officials. This lack of trust can be attributed to 
feelings of self-determination within each department to complete their own work. He 
notes there is intense competition among departments over a limited availability of 
resources.26  
To address this issue, Hagen hypothesizes that the law enforcement community 
needs to reach outside their own agencies into different disciplines. Public health workers 
and firefighters, much like police officers, are in frequent contact with the public. Hagen 
believes “law enforcement agencies should include these disciplines in their intelligence 
process.” Hagen’s work offers some tangible solutions to the problems mentioned by 
both practitioners and scholars.27 Some of the obstacles to collaboration among agencies 
that are described in this thesis are the same barriers that exist between the NYPD and the 
FDNY. Despite the development of the Citywide Incident Management System (CIMS) 
protocols, there are still unclear roles and responsibilities for each agency.  
Captain John P. Flynn, a Fire Captain who wrote a CHDS thesis entitled 
“Terrorism Information Management Within the New York City Fire Department: Past, 
Present and Future” notes that the “FDNY has instituted some novel and well-intentioned 
improvements in preparedness but falls short of truly enhancing the awareness of the 
26 Jerome D. Hagen, “Interagency Collaboration Challenges Among Homeland Security Disciplines in 




27 Ibid., 30. 
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average firefighter in his daily routine as he awaits the next terrorist event”28. Although 
his ideas about establishing a more productive information exchange between the FDNY 
and the NYPD are sound, there are some concepts that are problematic. For example, the 
author believes line firefighters should be assigned to the Joint Terrorist Task Force 
(JTTF), which currently employs two fire marshals. Flynn feels the fire marshals “are not 
operational personnel and as such correspond directly with ‘management’ rather than ‘the 
field.’”29 Additionally, Flynn takes issue with the adequacy of representation within Joint 
Terrorist Task Force, noting the NYPD’s 120 representatives verses the FDNY’s two. 
Flynn views the JTTF as an intelligence source, when in fact, it is actually an 
investigative unit. Having operational personnel in an investigative unit makes for an 
inefficient arrangement. Despite the problematic elements of Flynn’s thesis, he highlights 
the urgent need for collaboration between city agencies.30 
Captain Joseph McGeary of the FDNY describes the Goldwater-Nichols Act as a 
model New York City should use for collaboration in his thesis, “Applying Goldwater-
Nichols Reforms to Foster Interagency Cooperation between Public Safety Agencies in 
New York City.” The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986 was sponsored by Senator Barry Goldwater and Representative Bill Nichols. This 
act centralized the operational authority for the armed forces through the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs as opposed to the service chiefs from each individual branch of the service.  
McGeary describes the competitive relationship between the NYPD and the 
FDNY as analogous to that of the various branches of the military services with each 
other after World War II and continuing through the 1980s, culminating with the passage 
of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986. Most notably, McGeary points to the history of 
the “jurisdictional turf wars where both agencies claimed to be in charge.”31 He 
emphasizes that there is a lack of communication and information sharing. In addition, 
28 Ibid., 61. 
29 Ibid., 59. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Joseph McGeary, “Applying Goldwater-Nichols Reforms to Foster Interagency Cooperation 
between Public Safety Agencies in New York City” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 
accessed September 27, 2014, http://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/3630, 1. 
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McGeary details the lack of respect existing between the NYPD and FDNY for each 
other’s roles and responsibilities, and how it has even evolved into physical altercations 
between members or shouting matches between the commissioners. The author believes 
this behavior continues through the generations of police officers and firefighters, who 
rise through the ranks in an environment of competition and distrust.32  
McGreary posits that before information sharing between the two agencies can 
occur, they must develop a better working relationship. Thus, he recommends assignment 
to the New York City OEM for mid-level and staff-level positions from the NYPD and 
the FDNY. He believes this will build personal relationships and theoretically breakdown 
some of the stereotypes and barriers that have been built throughout their careers. 
McGreary explains, “It will familiarize these members with the priorities, concerns, and 
goals of other agencies” and allow for an environment in which they can collaborate 
freely.33  
McGeary also suggests joint education and training through more formalized 
drills to break previous habits. He also describes the use of the Citywide Incident 
Management System (CIMS), highlighting this system’s failures in comparison to that of 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS).34 A complaint echoed throughout 
this thesis and several others written by members of the FDNY is that the NYPD is 
designated as the single Incident Commander (IC) at any Chemical Biological 
Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) incident. 
In “New York City Fire Department Chief Officer’s Evaluation of the Citywide 
Incident Management System as it Pertains to Interagency Emergency Response,” FDNY 
Chief John Esposito addresses the CIMS protocols, questions the effectiveness and 
outlines the problems related to the policy. Furthermore, Esposito identifies the NYPD’s 
unwillingness to share information as a key problem with the CIMS policy.35  
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 158.  
34 Ibid. 
35 John M. Esposito, “New York City Fire Department Chief Officer’s Evaluation of the Citywide 
Incident Management System as It Pertains to Emergency Response” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2011), accessed January 20, 2013, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=691272, 47. 
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Esposito acknowledges his work only displays the viewpoint of the FDNY with 
no input from other city agencies, including “the main antagonist” to the FDNY, the 
NYPD. Esposito used a survey allowing the responders to add personal comments 
concerning CIMS. Most members complained about the makeup of the CIMS protocols, 
some members used this as an opportunity to complain about the NYPD, and several did 
not have any major issues.36 One executive respondent noted that although he has 
witnessed cooperation between the FDNY and the NYPD in the past, he did not have any 
occasion to order members of the NYPD to do something or ask them to refrain from 
doing a task.37 However, this executive did not have confidence that the NYPD would 
heed his advice, even when he was a subject matter expert. Finally, Esposito recommends 
that additional research be conducted to improve the interagency coordination and 
cooperation between the FDNY and NYPD.38 
Abdo Namood, author of “The Collaborative Capacity of the NYPD, FDNY, and 
EMS in New York City: A Focus on the First Line Officer,” presents the need for trust 
and collaboration among departments as essential training for newly hired police officers 
and firefighters. In addition, Namood recommends the executive staff of each of these 
agencies become involved in joint training efforts. As the title implies, the importance of 
the involvement of first-line supervisors in collaboration efforts is critical to any success 
the NYPD and FDNY will jointly achieve. The leadership must not only endorse 
collaboration, but also emphasize the need for the first-line supervisors and the “boots on 
the ground” to put this into practice. Furthermore, Namood suggests that joint training 
throughout the ranks will allow for a more collaborative working environment, especially 
in emergency conditions. Although the author is successful in addressing the importance 
of a collaborative working environment, he does not discuss sharing intelligence.39 
36 Ibid. 63–65. 
37 Ibid., 63. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Abdo Nahmod, “The Collaborative Capacity of the NYPD, FDNY, and EMS in New York City: A 
Focus on the First Line Officer,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010). 
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The thesis “Effective State, Local, and Tribal Police Intelligence: The New York 
City Police Departments Intelligence Enterprise-A Smart Practice”, written by NYPD 
Lieutenant John Comiskey, discusses the NYPD’s intelligence division. This document 
lays out the formation of the intelligence division and its history.40 Before 9/11, the 
intelligence division was considered a glorified escort service for visiting dignitaries and 
politicians. This division was not involved with crime-fighting tactics or providing 
intelligence to members of the NYPD.  
After the events of 9/11, however, this changed. Police Commissioner Raymond 
W. Kelly reinvented the intelligence division, making it a primary provider of 
intelligence to the law enforcement community. Comiskey also notes the need for 
intelligence sharing between all members of the department as well as outside agencies.41 
To understand the significance of this, it is important to understand that one of the 
cornerstones of the intelligence division is the Field Intelligence Officer (FIO) Program. 
The FIO program will be explained more later in this thesis. Comiskey highlighted state, 
local, and tribal law enforcement intelligence functions and the roles they play in the 
security of their areas, as well as their contributions to homeland security.42 In addition to 
reinventing the intelligence division, Commissioner Kelly also created a Counter-
Terrorism Bureau. He dedicated more than 1,000 investigators to the fight against 
terror.43  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS 
Both the governmental/scholarly publications and the practitioner reports provide 
overwhelming evidence that there is a lack of collaboration among first responder 
agencies in NYC. The governmental/scholarly publications also identify a need for 
intelligence sharing, and for firefighters to be involved in the intelligence gathering 
40 John Comiskey, “Effective State, Local, And Tribal Police Intelligence: The New York City Police 
Department’s Intelligence Enterprise: A Smart Practice,” (master’s thesis, Postgraduate School, 2010), 
accessed September 15, 2013, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=27141, 14–18. 
41 Ibid., 9. 
42 Ibid., 1. 
43 Ibid. 
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process. The practitioner reports are excellent at identifying impediments to 
collaboration, especially in New York City. The practitioner literature also identifies 
some general mechanisms by which collaboration could be improved such as joint 
training. 
What is absent from the literature are specific recommendations about who in 
each agency should be collaborating. Some of the practitioner literature makes a case for 
“the boots on the ground” in the FDNY and the NYPD to collaborate, but they do not 
identify which practitioners are best suited for this. A policy maker could not use the 
existing literature to determine which titles in each agency are best suited for 
collaboration, the frequency at which information sharing sessions should occur, and at 
what hierarchical level should intelligence-sharing actors be accountable for (i.e., should 
the collaborators operate at a community level, precinct level, borough level, or citywide 
level?). 
In the upcoming chapters, this report will add to the existing literature by 
exploring some of the current collaborative efforts that the NYPD and the FDNY have 
undertaken since September 11, 2001. It will also explore some of the collaborative 
efforts that have been arranged by New York City and New York state. It will review 
how far the NYPD and FDNY have come and highlight how far they need to go. It will 




III. CURRENT COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS BY THE NYPD 
The literature review supplied overwhelming evidence that there is a lack of 
collaboration between first responder agencies. After reading the critiques from the 
aforementioned authors, one might begin to suspect that these agencies are not capable of 
collaborating—that an autonomous mindset is in their “organizational DNA.” To address 
this concern, it is important to review the current collaborative programs of the first 
responder agencies in the New York City Area, specifically the NYPD and the FDNY.  
The NYPD has traditionally had “stove-piping issues.” However, the agency has 
advanced rapidly since September 11, 2001 in addressing this issue. This is evidenced by 
the partnerships the department has established in recent years with other entities such as 
the FBI, local police agencies, and private sector companies through initiatives such as 
the Joint Terrorist Task Force, Operation SHIELD, Operation Sentry, Operation Nexus, 
the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative, and the Securing the Cities campaign. Some of 
these partnerships will be surveyed in this chapter to provide evidence that the NYPD is 
capable of collaborating and to evaluate models for potential future NYPD-FDNY 
collaboration. 
A. THE JOINT TERRORIST TASK FORCE 
Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, 17 members of the NYPD and 
multiple Federal Bureau of Investigation agents manned the Joint Terrorism Task Force 
(JTTF). After his appointment to Police Commissioner, one of Ray Kelly’s top priorities 
was to increase JTTF staffing. Kelly dedicated 108 additional sworn officers to the task 
force. This commitment to the task force gave the NYPD insight into more federal cases 
that may have had an impact on New York City and allowed the department to more 
quickly tailor deployments as the intelligence became available. The NYPD summarized 
the effort by noting, “The JTTF not only provides the NYPD with access to national-level 
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classified intelligence, but it is also a means by which the NYPD can disseminate its own 
intelligence and analysis at the federal level and to other law enforcement agencies.”44  
As previously mentioned in the literature review, there are currently two FDNY 
fire marshals’ assigned to the JTTF. However, this arrangement does not necessarily 
enhance the working relationship between the NYPD and the FDNY—the main 
collaborator for NYPD purposes is the FBI. Also, any collaboration between the NYPD 
and FDNY in this task force would be similar to those found in the Office of Emergency 
Management arrangement—forced collaboration with the guidance of a third party. 
B. SHIELD 
The NYPD SHIELD program is the cornerstone of the department’s 
counterterrorism efforts. It is an umbrella program covering current and future NYPD 
counterterrorism initiatives within both the public and private sectors. The program 
involves cooperation between police officers and private sector security members to 
exchange information regarding terrorist threats or activities. The SHIELD program  
facilitates contact with private security and local businesses. These participants are 
informed of developing situations within the city, upcoming events, and new intelligence 
as it becomes available. The briefings between these entities address industry and 
geographic-specific concerns while providing feedback from the security field on policies 
instituted by the department. NYPD SHIELD allows private sector security managers 
access to information and the use of certain NYPD resources, which increases the level of 
communication between public and private sectors. The program provides training to 
members of the private sector by members of the NYPD who may aid in defending 
against terrorism.  
In addition, information specific to a particular sector or neighborhood is 
transmitted directly to those affected by one of several methods: 
• In-person intelligence and threat briefings conducted by Counterterrorism 
Bureau and Intelligence Division personnel  
44 “Counter-Terrorism Units,” New York Police Department, accessed September 26, 2014, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/administration/counterterrorism_units.shtml. 
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• Informal conferrals with Patrol Borough Counterterrorism Coordinators  
• NYPD website postings  
• SHIELD Alert e-mail messages  
The SHIELD program is also the main interface the NYPD has with the OEM for 
counterterrorism issues. Public access to this program is available online at the SHIELD 
website, which provides the members with business protection and emergency 
preparedness brochures. These programs take an all hazards hands-on approach to 
helping New Yorkers during an emergency and also increases the lines of 
communications between the NYPD and the majority of the population.45 
This public-private partnership is a clear example of a NYPD collaborative effort. 
It succeeds because the NYPD understands that the private security personnel have a 
unique perspective that the patrol officer may not have, such as knowing who belongs in 
their buildings or what may be out of place. A report conducted by The Aspen Institute of 
Homeland Security Program noted the degree to which private sector security officials 
are made privy to government intelligence and the degree to which the private sector 
augments the government’s intelligence collection by serving as additional “eyes and 
ears” on the ground.46  
The FDNY does not participate in SHIELD and because SHIELD has little to do 
with FDNY operations; it is not clear if the FDNY would receive any benefit if it did 
participate. However, the success of the program prompts the question: If the NYPD is 
providing and receiving information and intelligence from private security personnel, 
what would prohibit the department from engaging in the same sort of collaboration with 
the FDNY in a program that would benefit both agencies? 
45 “NYPD SHIELD: About the Shield Program,” New York Police Department, accessed September 
26, 2014, http://www.nypdshield.org/public/about.aspx. 
46 Clark K. Ervin, New York City’s Preparedness for Terrorism (and Catastrophic Natural Disasters) 
(Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 2008), accessed February 20, 2012, https://www.aspeninstitute.org/
sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/TerrorismReport.pdf. 
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C. OPERATION SENTRY  
The threat of terrorism is not limited to bustling metropolises—suburbs and other 
counties are all potential targets. This realization means communication with law 
enforcement agencies outside of NYC is essential. The NYPD has begun outreach to 
surrounding jurisdictions through Operation Sentry NYPD. This program is the 
department’s effort to forge counterterrorism partnerships with law enforcement agencies 
within a 200-mile radius of Manhattan. Although some in law enforcement may feel the 
NYPD is overstepping its boundaries, New York Post reporter Judith Miller quoted New 
Haven Connecticut Police Chief Francisco Ortiz as calling Operation Sentry 
“invaluable.”47 Through the program, Chief Ortiz was able to receive updates on regional 
threats that may have impact in his jurisdiction.  
Operation Sentry is not NYPD’s first outreach effort; the NYPD has previously 
maintained external relationships with outside agencies for information sharing. For 
example, the NYPD Detective Bureau has always worked alongside outside jurisdictions 
when looking for suspects who fled the city after committing a crime. There have also 
been instances when the detectives from other jurisdictions have come to NYC in search 
of fugitives and the NYPD has provided aid. Operation Sentry puts a formal system in 
place where previously this kind of collaboration happened on an ad hoc basis. 
Although Operation Sentry represents a successful NYPD collaborative effort, it 
is important to note that it is an “intra-industry” collaboration, not an “inter-industry” 
collaboration. Operation Sentry involves organizations with identical missions (police 
departments) collaborating with each other. An inter-industry collaboration would allow 
different “civil service stovepipes,” such as police departments and fire departments, to 
connect with each other. Nonetheless, Operation Sentry is important because it stands in 
contrast to assertions made by practitioner reports that claim inter-jurisdictional rivalries 
tend to stifle collaboration. Although the FDNY would be a poor fit in Operation Sentry, 
the success of the program leads an observer to theorize: If the NYPD can successfully 
collaborate with outside jurisdictions, it follows logically that it should not be overly 
47 Judith Miller, “NYPD’s Intelligence Advantage,” New York Post, July 16, 2007, accessed January 
12, 2013, http://nypost.com/2007/07/16/nypds-intelligence-advantage/. 
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difficult for the department to “take the next step” and commence inter-agency 
collaboration. Put another way, Operation Sentry has proved to be a successful inter-
jurisdictional collaboration, and it could viewed as “stepping stone” toward a successful 
collaboration with the FDNY.48 
D. OPERATION NEXUS 
Operation Nexus is similar to the SHIELD program—businesses join a network in 
an effort to prevent another terrorist attack. According to NYPD administrators, since the 
inception of this program, detectives assigned to Nexus have enrolled more than 25,000 
firms in this collaborative effort.49 
Operation Nexus recognizes that most potential terrorists will need to acquire the 
materials necessary to complete their plan from a business in or around the NYC area. By 
establishing a relationship with merchants, Nexus opens the lines of communication by 
warning business owners of what to look for in terms of potential threats. In addition, this 
also gives the merchant a point of contact within the NYPD.50  
The program allows operators and their employees to review business transactions 
and discern anything unusual or suspicious and to report such instances to authorities. For 
example, after the London bus and subway bombings in 2005, it was reported that the 
bombs appeared to have been made with hexamine, a compound often used as fuel for 
camping stoves. Within hours, Nexus detectives had visited every business in New York 
that sold hexamine fuel tablets.51 
Operation Nexus does not include the FDNY. This is a program weakness 
because the FDNY does thousands of building and business inspections each year, taking 
note of locations with hazards materials or flammable liquids. Some of these locations 
48 “NYPD Convenes Operation Sentry Members,” press release, May 5, 2009, New York Police 
Department, accessed September 25, 2014, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pr/pr_2009_ph10.shtml. 
49 “NYPD SHIELD: Operation Nexus,” New York Police Department, accessed August 20, 2013, 
http://www.nypdshield.org/public/nexus.aspx. 
50 Ibid. 
51 “Meet the New Supercops,” Popular Mechanics, October 1, 2009, accessed August 20, 2013, 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/2818211. 
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would not be identified via Operation Nexus. Although the FDNY conducts these 
inspections to give the local firefighters a situational awareness, it could also uncover 
important information that can be passed onto the NYPD.  
E. LOWER MANHATTAN SECURITY INITIATIVE  
The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI) was started in November 2008. 
According to the NYPD, it is “a networked surveillance project designed to detect threats 
and perform preoperational terrorist surveillance south of Canal Street in Lower 
Manhattan, combining increased police presence with technology to accomplish its 
mission.”52 Put simply, the program allows the NYPD to tap in to the CCTV feeds of the 
private buildings/businesses in lower Manhattan. The core of this program is the 
continuing partnership between the NYPD, public agencies, and private corporations.  
Part of this program required the department to obtain office space to be staffed 
24/7 by NYPD officers and serve as the central intake facility for all information gathered 
by the surveillance technology in the area. Public and private partners are offered seats in 
the Coordination Centers Operation Facility. The LMSI is a more advanced version of the 
city of London CCTV program “Ring of Steel.” The London Ring of Steel involves 
securing the city of London through an extensive system of security cameras. This 
“Ring” was constructed primarily to deter the Irish Republican Army (IRA) from 
targeting the city of London and to protect the city from other terrorist threats. The 
fortified virtual perimeter meant would-be attackers could not enter or depart the city 
without being recorded on camera.53 Similarly, the LMSI surveillance system covers 1.7 
square miles of lower Manhattan from Canal Street to Battery Park, including the areas 
between the East River and Hudson River. It protects high-profile and iconic locations in 
government, finance, banking, commerce, transportation, and telecommunications, 
52 “Counter-Terrorism Units,” New York Police Department. 
53 Cara Buckley, “Manhattan Takes Cue from London’s Ring of Steel,” New York Times, July 9, 2007, 
accessed January 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/09/world/americas/09iht-
security.1.6561247.html?_r=0. 
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paying special attention to 76 partner locations identified by the Department of Homeland 
Security.54  
The mission of LMSI is “to detect, pre-empt, and disrupt terrorist operations by 
utilizing the latest surveillance technology; closed circuit video feeds with video analytic 
software, fixed and mobile license plate readers, advanced explosive trace detection 
equipment, radiation detection vehicle and radiation detectors.”55 These sources of 
information all feed into a computer system and an operational dashboard then provides a 
complete security picture for lower Manhattan at the Coordination Operation center. By 
proactively monitoring the cameras coupled with video analytics, the NYPD is able to 
establish a coordination of alerts that will trigger an alarm when a predefined condition is 
encountered (e.g., an abandoned object, directional motion, motion detection, a tripwire, 
facial image capture, or object removal). The officer on duty will then respond to the alert 
and review the video to determine if any further response is required. These alerts 
provide the responding officers on patrol with situational awareness about what they may 
be walking into.  
The FDNY is not involved with the LMSI, and at first glance, the program does 
not appear like it would benefit the fire department. But real-time access to private CCTV 
is not only critical to the NYPD; it is an untapped safety asset for the FDNY. There are a 
number of missed opportunities each day to alert the FDNY of what its personnel are 
responding to when firefighters are deployed locations across the city. For example, all of 
the video cameras in the subway system in lower Manhattan are linked in to the LMSI; in 
the event of a gas attack, similar to the one that occurred in Tokyo in 1995, the video 
feeds would give all first responders a better view of what was happening and a 
situational awareness that previously was not afforded. If the live video feed was 
simultaneously relayed to FDNY, their responses could be safer and more effective.  
54 Matthew Harwood, “New York City’s Ring of Steel Gets Wider,” Security Management, October 5, 
2009, accessed September 21, 2014, http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/new-york-citys-ring-steel-
gets-wider-006294. 
55 “Counter-Terrorism Units,” New York Police Department. 
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F. SECURING THE CITIES  
Securing the Cities (STC) began in 2006 as a pilot project for the New York City 
region, to provide equipment, tools, and training through cooperative agreements 
managed by the New York Police Department, which distributes grant money to other 
participating agencies. According to the Department of Homeland Security, STC has 
“provided more than 5800 pieces of detection equipment, trained nearly 11,000 
personnel, and conducted more than a hundred drills.”56  
As part of the Securing the Cities program, on April 5, 2011, the NYPD, along 
with first responders from the tri-state area, conducted a five-day exercise in which they 
attempted to prevent a dirty bomb detonation. The exercise was a success and proved the 
NYPD is making the essential steps towards collaborating with non-traditional partners—
not just strictly law enforcement—in an all-hazards approach. The principal partners for 
this program were the FDNY, Connecticut State Police, New Jersey State Police (NJSP), 
the Metropolitan Transportation Authority Police Department (MTAPD), the Nassau 
County Police Department (NCPD), Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD), Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department (PAPD), NYC Department of 
Environmental Protection (NYC DEP), the NYC Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene (NYCHMH), and the Westchester County Department of Public safety 
(WCDPS). The NYPD’s participation in Securing the Cities is the best example of a 
program via which the department works collaboratively with the FDNY.57 
This chapter reviewed some of the enhanced collaboration the NYPD has 
undertaken in recent years with the aforementioned agencies. Some practical 
improvements to collaborative programs have been made by the NYPD. The evolution of 
these efforts is a continuous process, which improves with technological advances. 
Through continuous reassessment, the NYPD needs to continue to look for opportunities 
56 “DHS Supports Exercise of Securing the Cities Program Designed to Detect Radiological and 
Nuclear Threats,” Department of Homeland Security [blog], April 5, 2011, accessed August 07, 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/blog/2011/04/05/dhs-supports-exercise-securing-cities-program-designed-detect-
radiological-and  
57 New York City Police Department, “Police Commissioner Kelly Chairs Securing the Cities,” news 
release, November 7, 2013, accessed September 27, 2014, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/pr/
pr_2013_11_07_securing_cities_meeting.shtml. 
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to enhance the roles of all public safety agencies. The expansion of the role of individual 
agencies into fields previous out of their scope should now be considered as a matter of 
course. With this in mind, the limited role played by FDNY in certain responses should 
be revisited. In reconsidering the roles of various public safety agencies and in an attempt 
to draw on each agencies capabilities, the role of the FDNY should be reconsidered. 
Those areas of collaboration with the FDNY may be expanded. Additionally, the FDNY 
may be utilized to perform tasks previously not considered in its purview. In this effort, 
agencies may capitalize on previously missed opportunity for optimal response to critical 
incidents. The next chapter will explore similar changes to the FDNY in collaboration 
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IV. FDNY COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS 
This chapter will highlight some of the advances the FDNY has made and areas 
where there may be an opportunity to work more effectively with the NYPD. The FDNY 
does not operate as many collaborative efforts as the NYPD; however, it is important to 
remember that the former is an agency with approximately 9,000 members, and the latter 
is an agency with 40,000 members.  
A. COORDINATED BUILDING INSPECTION AND DATA ANALYSIS 
SYSTEM  
In the past, the FDNY scheduled building inspections on an ad-hoc basis, and 
there was no thought given to life safety or fire risk posed by these building. This 
outdated system meant that more convenient and less risky buildings might have been 
inspected more often than those posing higher level of risk. Furthermore, this inspection 
system was stored on individual computers where it could not be shared with anyone 
other than those who were personally involved in the inspection. 
To address this shortcoming, the FDNY developed the Coordinated Building 
Inspection and Data Analysis Systems (CBIDAS). The creation of this new database for 
building inspections and safety information allows the firefighters as well as supervisors 
on site to obtain situational awareness before entering a fire location. This system is also 
accessible in instances when the situation is not emergent. The CBIDAS is a 
collaborative resource that is shared with the Department of Buildings and the 
Department of Environmental protection. Also, the shared computer system allows the 
FDNY to “make better use of the other agencies’ building information to help improve 
public safety.”58 Although the FDNY is working with the other city agencies in 
CBIDAS, the NYPD is not one of those agencies. This is a missed opportunity because 
the NYPD should be using all available information regarding the layout of a building 
when responding to emergency calls, executing search warrants, etc.  
58 Fire Department New York, FDNY Strategic Plan 2011–2013, accessed January 13, 2013, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/publications/FDNY_strategic_plan_2011_2013.pdf, 8.  
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B. CENTER FOR TERRORISM AND DISASTER PREPAREDNESS  
In 2004, the FDNY created a Center for Counter-Terrorism and Disaster 
Preparedness (CTDP), which coordinates training and runs drills. According to the 
FDNY, “the CTDP exercise design team creates and conducts tabletop, functional, and 
full-scale exercises based on identified risks and requests from FDNY officers, other 
governmental agencies, and the private sector.”  
The CTDP conducts about 40 exercises per year. To design the exercises, the 
FDNY collaborates with local and national intelligence providers, including the National 
Operations Center (NOC), the New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC), and the 
NYPD Counter Terrorism Division.59 The CTDP looks to be in the fore front of training 
as it “survey[s] a wide range of interdisciplinary research”60 It must be noted, however, 
that the training and drilling are specific to FDNY personnel, and the NYPD does not 
regularly participate in these exercises. 
C. FIRE SERVICE INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE  
In September 2006, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) engaged 
members of the fire service in an intelligence-sharing initiative. The FDNY met several 
times with DHS representatives to develop and initiate a plan, which was reevaluated 
every 90 days. Approximately one year later, they came up with the FSIE.  
The Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise (FSIE) is a partnership between the 
FDNY and the 15 largest fire departments within the Unites States. The goal of the FSIE 
is to facilitate the identification and development of information/intelligence sharing 
networks. The FDNY was one of the original agencies to become part of this initiative, 
and it exposed the FDNY to a formal information and intelligence-sharing program. 
Unfortunately, information gathered from the FSIE is rarely shared with the NYPD.61  
59 Ibid., 12. 
60 Fire Department New York, FDNY Counter Terrorism Risk Management Strategy, 2011, accessed 
August 20, 2014, http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/pdf/publications/FDNY_ct_strategy_2011_12.pdf, 12. 
61 “Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise: A Unique Program with a Big Impact,” YouTube video, 
March 31, 2014, accessed October 07, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FtuNaqu7zc8. 
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With intelligence on the forefront the FDNY has expanded its intelligence role 
beyond consumer to producer. It has developed the “Watchline” as a weekly newsletter 
with noteworthy stories and topics directed towards emergency responders. The FDNY 
estimates this product is delivered over 100 agencies throughout the government and 
outside the United States.62 In addition to the Watchline, FDNY also uses a product 
called Fireguards. These are PowerPoint presentations that expand on different issues, 
such as the FDNY definition of the Mumbai style attack, which is an incident in which 
the terrorists used fire as part of a terrorist attack.  
These are only a small look at some of the changes the FDNY is utilizing to 
enhance firefighter and public safety that may also benefit the NYPD. It is not highly 
sensitive information and could easily be shared if requested by the NYPD. This seems 
like another missed opportunity for mid-level management to be interacting and 
exchanging information. The next chapter gets to the lead agency for collaboration in 
NYC, the Office of Emergency Management (OEM).  
 
 
62 Fire Department New York, FDNY Counter Terrorism Risk Management Strategy. 
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V. OTHER CITYWIDE COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS 
This chapter looks at the role of the NYC Office of Emergency Management 
(OEM). City agencies, such as the OEM, have been working on enhancing relationships 
and public safety for some time. OEM was mandated to develop citywide protocols for 
the response to and recovery from man-made and natural disasters and emergencies. 
Furthermore, OEM established these protocols to ensure collaboration and cooperation 
between all city agencies, including the between the FDNY and NYPD. The OEM’s 
success has been varied, and it worth exploration. 
A. THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT  
The New York City OEM’s is the coordinating agency for NYC’s response to and 
recovery from an emergency. What is unique to OEM though is how it has evolved under 
different mayors and commissioners. A look at the history of the OEM reveals its 
importance in developing a functioning first responder collaborative effort in New York 
City. 
In 1984, the Office of Civil Preparedness was renamed the Office of Emergency 
Management and placed within the jurisdiction of the NYPD.63 In 1996, an executive 
order from then Mayor Rudolph Giuliani created the Mayor’s Office of Emergency 
Management as a “standalone office,” managed by City Hall. An OEM charter was 
created at that time, which states that OEM:  
shall be the lead agency in coordination and facilitation of resources in 
incidents involving public safety and health, including incidents that may 
involve acts of terrorism. All agencies shall provide the department 
promptly any information or intelligence relevant to the performance of 
emergency management functions and shall collect and make available 
any information requested by the department for use in emergency 
planning agencies, and shall promptly provide the department with all 
63 New York City Office of Emergency Management, “About OEM: History of NYC OEM,” accessed 
September 26, 2014, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/about/history.shtml. 
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appropriate material, equipment and resources needed for emergency 
management functions, including personnel.64 
Mayor Giuliani relied on the OEM to coordinate the various city agencies that 
participated in the recovery effort after the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001. 
Although the initial response to the attack on the Trade Center could not be labeled a 
successful collaboration between the NYPD and FDNY, the subsequent recovery effort 
as first responders cleared debris around “the pile,” represented a more successful 
collaboration between the agencies—albeit a forced one because of OEM intervention. 
That was one of the reasons that the City Council granted OEM agency status by revising 
the New York City Charter in November, 2001.65  
In 2004, New York City adopted the Citywide Incident Management System 
(CIMS) model for incident management.66 CIMS has been developed and managed by 
OEM to define the roles and responsibilities for city, state, and other government entities, 
and nonprofit and private sector organizations that perform and support emergency 
response. At event scenes, OEM will send coordinators to facilitate interagency 
communication with all city agencies, not just the NYPD and the FDNY, and resource 
requests and, more importantly, ensure agencies follow CIMS.  
The role OEM has played with assisting in relationships between the NYPD and 
the FDNY can be seen in some of the drills they have conducted. One such drill was the 
“Command Post Exercise” conducted in June, 2011. The objective of this exercise was to 
get both agencies together and reinforce the need for a unified incident command as well 
as a unified operations section. In coordinating the exercise, OEM demanded that 
participants establish effective communications, maintain flow of information, and 
practice joint decision making. 
64 New York City Office of Emergency Management, OEM Charter, accessed September 26, 2014, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/downloads/pdf/oem_charter.pdf. 
65 New York City Office of Emergency Management, “About OEM: History of NYC OEM.” 
66 New York City Office of Emergency Management, “Citywide Incident Management System 
(CIMS),” accessed September 27, 2014, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/planning_response/
about_cims.shtml. 
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Another training exercise run through OEM was the “New York City Resilience.” 
This six-part drill was built around the city’s response to a terrorist attack, specifically 
multiple car bombings. More than 1,000 volunteers and first responders participated in 
this 2011 exercise. An important component of the drill was the coordination between the 
NYPD and FDNY. It addressed search and rescue, medical triage, law enforcement, and 
investigation. This operation illustrated the role of OEM in planning and preparing for all 
emergencies and facilitating partnerships.67 
B. CITYWIDE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
There is a difference between cooperation and collaboration. When cooperating, 
entities can strive towards their own, unrelated goals and then simply agree to operate in 
such a fashion that will not disrupt the other entity from achieving its goals. When 
collaborating, two entities share a goal and then work together to achieve that goal. 
Despite the lack of collaboration, overall cooperation between the NYPD and the FDNY 
has improved since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Some believe that improved 
cooperation was partially due to the development of a formal incident management 
system.  
Assessments made by the 9/11 Commission were critical of the NYPD and the 
FDNY and the lack of collaboration and coordination between these two agencies. It was 
obvious to the commission that there was no clear leadership or direction, and it appeared 
as though the responding agencies were working autonomously with little or no 
collaboration. In response to this criticism, New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
signed an executive order to implement the Citywide Incident Command System (CIMS) 
in April, 2005. CIMS was designed to conform to the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS). Although most incidents are managed at a local level, NIMS provides a 
foundation or template for the management of incidents that are bigger in scale and allow 
the flexibility to change rapidly regardless of the size or complexity of the incident. It is a 
comprehensive systematic approach to incident management that incorporates the best 
67 New York City Office of Emergency Management, “OEM Command Post Exercises,” OEM 
Biennial 2013, accessed September 27, 2014, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/news/biennial2013/
index_1.html#15. 
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practices of first responders throughout the country. The Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 5 (HSPD-5) required that “beginning in federal fiscal year 2005, all federal 
departments and agencies make the adoption of NIMS a prerequisite for State and local 
governments to receive federal preparedness assistance.”68 
Although CIMS increased cooperation between the FDNY and NYPD, it was 
intended to enhance collaboration. It failed in this respect. This is due to the fact that the 
CIMS system that New York City adopted sparked very contentious debate at the highest 
levels of the NYPD and FDNY over which entity would be the lead agency at 
emergencies.  
For example, one of the main points of contention was which agency would be 
the lead agency for response to a hazardous materials incident. In most locales throughout 
the country, the fire department is the lead agency. In New York City, CIMS stated the 
NYPD “will be the primary agency (Incident Commander) at chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear/hazmat incidents. If the NYPD determines there is no actual or 
suspected criminal activity or terrorism, a unified command will be implemented.”69 
Eventually, the Police Commissioner and Fire Commissioner were both called to testify 
before a city council hearing to resolve the matter. Although the FDNY eventually 
accepted CIMS protocols such as the aforementioned example, it did so begrudgingly.  
 As evidenced by several theses written by FDNY personnel, CIMS remains a 
point of contention within the hierarchy of the FDNY. With the implementation of CIMS, 
a “Primary Agency Matrix” was developed as a resource for city agency personnel. This 
matrix tried to use the core competencies of each of the New York City agencies to 
identify the primary agency at different types of incidents. Sometimes, the assignment of 
a primary agency according to the matrix is perplexing. One example of this is “auto 
extrication.” The primary agency for these types of incidents between the NYPD and the 
FDNY is designated as the “first to arrive.”70 Therefore, if the FDNY arrives on scene 
68 White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5. 
69 New York City Office of Emergency Management, “Primary Agency Matrix.” 
70 Ibid. 
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with better equipment and more personnel to execute an auto extrication, but the NYPD 
happens to be the first to get there, the NYPD will still remain the primary agency. For 
the FDNY to follow the rules of the Primary Agency Matrix represents cooperation, but 
in this example “following the rules” does not equate to collaboration.71  
Although the FDNY’s and NYPD’s adherence to the Citywide Incident 
Management System represents cooperation not collaboration, it is an arrangement 
worth examining. Effective collaboration between agencies with different missions 
cannot happen overnight; that is, the “groundwork” must be laid to help the agencies 
become familiar with each other so eventually mutual trust can be established. Put 
another way, cooperation is a precondition for collaboration. Having the agencies 
participate in the Citywide Incident Management System is paving the way for the NYPD 
and FDNY to take part in more advanced collaborative efforts. 
The breakdown of the history of OEM and its role as the coordinating agency for 
NYC show there is still a long way to go. Although it has made progress meeting several 
of the federal mandates for incident management, it can be inferred by some of the 
literature that not all first responder personnel are completely satisfied with the outcome. 
While the OEM, along with the NYPD and the FDNY, have made great strides there is 
still work to be done in this area. This leads into the next chapter and the review of the 
collaborative efforts on the next level, New York State. While NYC, based on size, will 
do much of its emergency response as a stand-alone entity, no one agency can be 
successful without collaboration inside and outside of NYC. 
71 Ibid.  
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VI. NEW YORK STATE FIRST RESPONDER COLLABORATIVE 
EFFORTS 
This chapter will look at how fusion centers operate in New York state and how 
NYC could benefit from this program as a model. Although the State of New York has 
multiple collaborative efforts in the realm of counterterrorism with the federal 
government, it does not routinely involve participants from municipal agencies. 
However, there is one program that the state operates that encourages collaboration 
among first responders: fusion centers. 
According to the Department of Homeland Security, a fusion center is defined as 
“a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and 
information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, 
investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.”72 That definition should be the 
model of a collaborative effort the NYPD and the FDNY should take. 
Fusion centers are not emergency operations centers, which are minimally staffed 
until a crisis; rather, they are continually functioning investigative support centers that 
have personnel permanently assigned from various agencies. Each representative is 
intended to be a conduit of information from his or her agency, a representative who can 
infuse that agency-specific information into the collective body of information for 
analysis.  
Conversely, when the fusion center needs intelligence, the representative is the 
conduit back to the agency to communicate, monitor, and process the new information 
needs. The primary objective of a fusion center is the ability to provide situational 
awareness and warnings that are supported by vetted intelligence. These centers also 
benefit the law enforcement community by providing agencies with resources, including 
organized intelligence support. In addition, they can assist law enforcement with 
intelligence-led policing and systematically gather and share information statewide to 
reduce crime and produce safer communities. 
72 Department of Homeland Security, “Fusion Centers and Emergency Operation Centers.” 
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Prior to September 11, 2001, fusion centers were primarily “law enforcement 
centric,” but they have definitely evolved. According to the Washington Post 
investigation “Top Secret America,” New York State operates six fusion centers: the 
New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC), the NYPD Terrorism Threat Announces 
Group (TTAG), the Rockland County Intelligence Center, the Suffolk County Police 
Department, the Upstate New York Regional Intelligence Center (UNYRIC), the 
Westchester County crime analysis unit (a component of the Westchester County Police 
Department that operates as an all crimes fusion center). The primary function of each of 
these agencies is law enforcement. This shows what has been evident all along, that law 
enforcement agencies have been using the fusion process and information and 
intelligence sharing for a while.  
The challenge is now to incorporate the fire service, for the NYPD specifically, 
the FDNY, into its intelligence process. According to the NYPD website, “the TTAG 
performs analysis and disseminates open-source and classified information to recipients 
within the department, the private sector, the US intelligence community and all the law 
enforcement agencies.”73An emerging component of many fusion centers is to include an 
expanded group of stakeholders, such as public safety, homeland security, the private 
sector, and critical infrastructure communities. Fusion centers are the structural 
embodiment of collaboration. Moreover, they increase communication and continuity of 
service for all agencies in public safety, while decreasing duplication. 
Fusion centers are encouraged to have mission statements. The idea is that it 
focuses the efforts of the organization moving forward and it lets the members know 
what they are getting from a fusion center. A sample mission statement is that of the 
Upstate New York Regional Center (UNYRIC):  
To advance the efficient, timely, accurate exchange of information 
between all New York state law enforcement agencies. The UNYRIC 
focuses on all aspects of criminal activity in the 54 counties outside the 
73 “Counter-Terrorism Units,” New York Police Department. 
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New York City area and interacts with law enforcement agencies 
nationwide.74  
Both the NYPD and the FDNY participate in the state-run fusion centers; 
however, there is no direct collaboration between the NYPD and FDNY in this forum. 
This is because of the nature of the centers, which, despite their post-9/11 expansion, are 
still very law-enforcement oriented. NYC will need both the NYPD and the FDNY to 





74 Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice, Fusion Center Guidelines for 
Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era (Washington, DC: Department of 
Homeland Security and Department of Justice, 2006, accessed September 22, 2013, it.ojp.gov/
docdownloader.aspx?ddid=1149. 
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VII. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT CITYWIDE, NYPD, FDNY, AND 
NEW YORK STATE COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS 
This chapter will look at the overall picture of the current collaborative efforts, 
again highlighting areas of missed opportunities or shortcomings. By examining the 
aforementioned collaborative efforts, it is evident that the NYPD and FDNY are capable 
of collaborating—and that an autonomous mindset is not in their “organizational DNA.” 
However, it would seem that they still tend to collaborate with other law enforcement and 
fire agencies (respectively). Perhaps this is because it is easier to collaborate with an 
entity with an identical organizational mission.  
Also notable is that despite its reputation for being opaque, the NYPD can share 
intelligence. The department does so with civilians in programs such as SHIELD and 
Operation Nexus. This stands in contrast to multiple practitioner sources explored in the 
literature review. The FDNY and NYPD have quasi-collaborative efforts with each other. 
They work together in the Office of Emergency Management and via the CIMS 
construct. But these tend to be executive collaborations, which encourage communication 
between “the brass” in each agency. Absent from the efforts reviewed is a program that 
encourages collaboration on a lower or middle-management level.  
Overall, the NYPD and FDNY do not regularly collaborate. They do so only at 
the occasional training exercise or during a major incident. This is particularly 
unfortunate because all of their collaborative programs that involve the general public or 
other governmental agencies involve regular collaboration. There is no program in which 
the NYPD and FDNY work together in an ongoing collaboration similar to those found in 
fusion centers. 
Field-level collaborative efforts are non-existent—local precinct and fire 
personnel do not know each other, and do not know who in a precinct/firehouse to talk to 
when they have/want valuable information. Although the FDNY’s Center for 
Counterterrorism and Disaster Preparedness tells its staff to notify the NYPD of any 
intelligence they think would be worth sharing, an organization that relies on members to 
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make haphazard notifications is not proactively collaborating. There is no program in 
place that recognizes the value firefighters have as intelligence gatherers. 
Thus, if the FDNY and NYPD are going to effectively collaborate and share 
intelligence, the following deficiencies must be addressed: 
• There is currently no program/mechanism to facilitate on-going 
information and intelligence sharing between non-executive FDNY and 
NYPD personnel. 
• The NYPD has failed to identify specific actors for which collaboration 
with the FDNY is part of their duties and responsibilities (i.e., The NYPD 
Patrol Guide lists the duties and responsibilities for ranks, such as 
sergeants/lieutenants/captains, and the duties and responsibilities for titles, 
such as training sergeant and special operations lieutenant; nowhere in the 
Patrol Guide75 can one find a duty or responsibility telling a specific rank 
or title to “Collaborate with the FDNY.”) 
• It is likely that one of the key reasons that no such program/mechanism 
exists is because the NYPD does not recognize FDNY’s value as 
intelligence gatherers. This is evidenced by the fact that the NYPD prefers 
to collaborate with other law enforcement agencies. 
Most of the above collaborative models are ill-suited to address these deficiencies. 
Programs such as Operation Sentry, Securing the Cities, and the Coordinated Building 
Inspection and Data Analysis System (CBIDAS) are situational collaborative efforts; that 
is, they tend to require a triggering event, such as a fleeing fugitive or training exercise, 
for collaboration to commence. They do not foster constant collaboration on matters both 
large and small. Other programs such as the Lower Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI) 
are high cost enterprises that are specially developed to collect only certain types of 
intelligence. If the NYPD and FDNY looked to create a collaborative model based on one 
of the previously discussed efforts, the Joint Terrorist Task Force and fusion centers hold 
the most promise as starting points because both of these enterprises place non-executive 
personnel in constant and close proximity with each other. The “fusion center model” 
possesses a distinct advantage over the “Joint Terrorist Task Force model” in that it 
fusion centers are designed to give stakeholders equal footing in the collaboration. Also, 
75 New York Police Department, NYPD Patrol Guide (internal document, New York Police 
Department, New York). 
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fusion centers are designed to synthesize a greater variety of information into usable 
intelligence and are not preoccupied with any particular type of crime and/or threat. 
The next chapter looks at a jurisdiction close to NYC where collaboration is a key 
component of how it does business. While not nearly the size of NYC and its major first 
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VIII. A COLLABORATIVE MODEL FROM ANOTHER 
JURISDICTION 
This chapter will look at a model of public safety collaboration on a much smaller 
scale than NYC. Despite the considerable differences in population, personnel strength 
and geographic size, the lessons learned by a comparison with the city of White Plains 
are worthwhile. On review, the NYPD and FDNY had previously employed collaborative 
efforts with limited success, which at least demonstrated an ability to coordinate. 
However, none of these efforts provided a truly effective model for the NYPD and 
FDNY to replicate with consistency.  
The size, population, and diversity of NYC make it an anomaly and difficult to 
compare with other cities, but those comparisons are still necessary if innovation is 
desired. Small to mid-sized cities are often the incubators of urban innovations that can 
be adapted and amended to suit the needs of cities of disparate sizes. The nature of a 
global city such as New York, as a tourism hub with iconic places, home to business 
headquarters, and sensitive locations makes it a taxing place in which to provide public 
safety services. The aplomb with which those services are provided is a testament to the 
abilities of the NYPD and the FDNY. There is always a need and the room for 
improvement. Reviewing programs in other municipalities provide lessons and best 
practices to improve public safety in NYC.  
To this end, successful public safety models in other municipalities can offer 
ideas for programmatic changes, interagency cooperation, and more utilitarian functions 
for the police and fire service that may be lacking in New York City. By such a 
comparison, the city of White Plains public safety model offers a template for the 
successful integration of the police and fire departments, with interoperable 
communications, unified command and co-located executives as its the strengths. White 
Plains is a mid-sized city in affluent Westchester County, just north of NYC. The county 
seat, the city of White Plains is a commercial, retail, and financial hub, with a population 
of almost 60,000 that grows to an estimated quarter of a million daily with business and 
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commerce.76 White Plains sees many of the same issues as NYC, albeit on a smaller and 
probably more easily managed scale. Approximately one year after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the city of White Plains hired Frank Straub, a public safety manager 
with a vision. At the time of his hiring, he proclaimed: “The biggest thing for me is that 
unless you have fire and police (working together), you’re looking at a disaster, no 
agency can do it themselves—not even the 36,000 officer NYPD.”77 
Once installed as the White Plains Public Safety Director, Straub he felt he had 
two different agencies who rarely communicated. To address this dysfunctional dynamic, 
he took leaders from each agency and showed them the “common ground” on which they 
both operate. Straub moved the two chief executives from each agency into an office 
right next to each other, when they both participate in weekly co-agency meetings. He 
also began inter-agency initiatives, through which police officers and firefighters were 
cross-trained in some of their counterparts’ core competencies. For example, police 
officers were trained to identify office building and public housing fire code violations 
and report them to the fire department. Likewise, firefighters have received training to 
help them identify telltale signs of gang activity, such as graffiti tags, and how they report 
them to police. The elite rescue units and emergency units from each agency began 
training together on an increasingly regular basis. Police officer and firefighters took the 
co-training opportunity to get comfortable with working together regularly so it did not 
just occur at the scene of emergencies. 
The collaborative approach used in White Plains broke down the barriers between 
the agencies, and now they are comfortable engaging in problem-solving together. Many 
issues were not seen as problems for the police department to address, or problems for the 
fire department to solve go unaddressed. Rather, they are viewed as public safety issues, 
where the combined resources of both agencies are leveraged to solve a problem. Straub 
criticized the relationship between the NYPD and FDNY, and he observed that if real 
76 “Welcome to an Engaged Community,” City of White Plains, accessed September 06, 2014, 
http://www.cityofwhiteplains.com/index.aspx?nid=248. 
77 John Buntin, “Battle of the Badges,” September 2005, accessed September 08, 2014, 
http://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/Battle-Badges.html 
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collaboration between the agencies was ever to occur, “places like New York need to find 
small areas where they can work together on a daily basis.”78 
Looking at the White Plains model, it is evident that it had three characteristics 
that led to a successful collaboration. First, key agency personnel were situated in a co-
terminus fashion to encourage direct communication. Even in the age of digital 
communication, the importance of having key personnel in close physical proximity with 
their interagency counterparts should not be overlooked. The co-location of the police 
and fire chiefs’ offices ensures constant face-to-face meetings to discuss even the most 
mundane of subjects. Stronger interpersonal relationships are forged and interagency trust 
is firmly established at the executive level. 
Second, having a third party, an independent arbiter such as a public safety 
manager, serving to referee issues between agencies helps to identify the “common 
ground” shared by both agencies operates is an excellent tactic to promote collaboration. 
When different public safety agencies recognize the existence of similar interest address 
the same issue, they are more likely to come together to problem solve.  
Finally, the inter-agency initiatives and cross-training of personnel ensures that 
the front line field units and first line supervisors in both the police and fire departments 
are comfortable and familiar with their counterparts’ roles and proficiencies by habitually 
working together with regularity. The White Plains model demonstrates how police 
officers and firefighters can coordinate efforts, working together regularly to address 
small issues, enhancing their ability and willingness to collaborate during more sizable 
events, emergencies, and critical incidents.  
These successfully implemented characteristics demonstrate a collaborative 
model adaptable to the needs of NYC. The implementation of such cooperative measures 
in NYC will require efforts of a much larger scope, given the characteristics of NYC. 
That ability to reach across city agencies needs to be to be expanded to include those 
private sector stakeholders who bear some of the same burdens as the police and fire 
departments. The collection and dissemination of critical information of concern to both 
78 Ibid. 
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public safety and the private sector should be consistent and freely traded with an eye 
toward enhancing public safety and efficiently deploying personnel while ensuring the 
economic well-being of the city’s business community.  
Efforts to cooperate with partners from outside the city remain paramount in a 
global city such as NYC. The multi-jurisdictional nature of the city coupled with NYC’s 
dominance in the metropolitan area requires interagency cooperation with state, federal, 
local, and multi-state agencies to address ongoing issues, terrorism, critical incidents, and 
recurring, common public safety issues. The use of technology needs to be embraced, 
integrated and interoperable. Both the police and fire departments need to have 
familiarity with those technologies that are adaptable and supportive of the missions of 
both agencies.  
Finally, there needs to be a realization that there are times when the roles of both 
agencies are more alike than they are different. Each agency’s personnel should have 
more than a basic understanding of the fundamental roles and needs of the other agency. 
Firefighters should embrace their unique ability to support the police when they observe 
and report information of a criminal or terrorist nature detected during routine firefighting 
calls. In a similar vein, police may be tasked with assisting firefighters to gain entry for 
inspections, enforcement and ease of access to locations. Such measures are highlighted 




In proposing a realignment of services with long traditions, there is an expected 
reluctance to surrender responsibilities and to retreat from roles that represent the very 
essence of each distinct profession. The progress of the modern era requires age-old 
institutions, such as the police and fire services, to adapt and become more accepting of 
newly prescribed roles. To this end a series of recommendations are offered to make the 
police-fire collaboration a more realistic undertaking, allowing each service to maintain 
distinct responsibilities while at the same time engineering a policy of collaboration that 
assigns new roles to each, encourages counterpart familiarity, and demands the exchange 
of information. 
While comprehensive, the recommendations offered are malleable, open to 
variations that may prove more successful. To begin to employ a more collaborative 
approach to public safety and counter-terrorism, agencies must be open and flexible in 
embracing these newly recommended roles and responsibilities. Timely review, repeated 
reassessment, and constant reevaluation of these policies will allow for successful 
innovations to become efficient, sustainable, and enduring best practices. 
A. RECOMMENDATION 1: OPEN UP CURRENT PROGRAMS WITHIN 
EACH AGENCY TO THEIR COUNTERPARTS 
The first recommendation this thesis offers is for NYPD and the FDNY to take 
advantage of programs offered by each other. While on the surface some of these 
programs seem law enforcement or fire service specific, there is value to be taken out 
from each for their counterpart. 
• NYPD Shield program consists of over 10,000 members yet very few are 
FDNY. In consideration of what value the SHIELD program could bring 
to the FDNY, we should look at the product that they produce. While a 
component of SHIELD is pushing out alerts on major events around the 
country and internationally, there is an analytical component that does an 
assessment of these events. After the assessment, SHEILD runs regular 
briefings for the private sector and security personnel. The NYPD will 
bring in analysts to explain the situation and try to give a security 
perspective and an assessment of the tactics being used and how it can 
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impacts on NYC. Certainly, FDNY could benefit from the same 
presentation—it would give members a situational awareness of how these 
events could affect their response. 
• Operation Nexus involves getting businesses to report suspicious business 
encounters that may have a nexus to terrorism. Realizing that some of 
these business owners are experts in their field, the NYPD relies on their 
expertise in certain areas to alert authorities of potential suspicious 
activity. The NYPD should consider including the FDNY as a partner in 
soliciting business to get involved with this program during the course of 
its regular interactions with the public. 
• Through Operation Sentry the NYPD has regular meetings and briefings 
with regional and multi-jurisdictional agencies (approximately 100 state 
and local law enforcement agencies). These briefings help to identify 
potential threats that may come from outside New York City. This 
program was developed in recognition of the fact that there have been 
terrorist attacks abroad that have been planned and staged from outside the 
target cities, such as the recent attacks in London and Madrid 
(domestically, the 1993 and 2001 World Trade Center attacks fit this 
criteria, too). Operation Sentry highlights the importance of 
communication and collaboration between jurisdictions. This program is 
also utilized for disseminating other law enforcement, sensitive 
information such as gang, narcotics and other criminal activities. While 
the FDNY would not need to be included on criminal briefings, it should 
be part of briefings that include terrorist activities and tactics and how they 
impact New York City.  
• The Lower Manhattan Security Initiative (LMSI) program is a network of 
closed circuit cameras, as well as chemical, biological, and radioactive 
sensors deployed throughout lower and mid-town Manhattan. This system 
allows the NYPD to be networked into private and public cameras that 
observe public areas. When they are alerted to an issue, the camera 
“monitors” can view it and give real-time perspective to responding 
personnel. Giving FDNY access to this system would let firefighters see 
calls for service in real-time in the coverage zone. (If a firehouse was 
dispatched to a call for service, LMSI could relay information to 
responding FDNY personnel and provide situational awareness—the 
firefighters would know what hazards are in public view while they are 
still blocks away).  
• The Global Affairs Lecture Series is designed for uniformed and civilian 
members of the NYPD. It enhances their understanding of the terror 
threats and events around the globe and the potential impact of these 
threats/events on New York City. This is much like the SHIELD program, 
and it seems like a missed opportunity for the NYPD and FDNY to meet 
under non-stressful times to build relationships. 
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In parallel, FDNY has several programs that on the surface may provide some 
value to the NYPD. 
• The Coordinated Building Inspection and Data Analysis Systems 
(CBDIAS) was developed in phases, using information from the 
Department of Buildings and Department of Environmental Protection. 
Personnel created a database with all the safety information about the 
locations they inspect. As the program advances to the next phase, it will 
include direct access to information from other city agencies. Giving the 
NYPD instant access may allow them new information as it prepares for 
search warrants or hunt for wanted individuals in these buildings. 
• The Fire Service Intelligence Service (FSIE) is an information sharing tool 
to get the fire service into the homeland security information and 
intelligence sharing. The FDNY developed the two intelligence products: 
the “Watchline” and “Fireguards.” These two products are used to get the 
latest intelligence and information out to the units in the field. The NYPD 
should include this in its review of intelligence products to insure they are 
not without critical information. 
To create a better mechanism for information and intelligence sharing between 
the FDNY and NYPD with regard to counterterrorism, this thesis makes three 
recommendations. The first of these is conceptual; that is, to promote a new outlook in 
both of these agencies about the value FDNY personnel can have as intelligence 
gatherers. The second two recommendations offer methods that can operationalize this 
concept. Each recommendation is a concrete plan for a collaborative program that will 
increase New York City’s capacity for intelligence gathering and counterterrorism 
preparedness. 
B. RECOMMENDATION 2: THE NYPD MUST RECOGNIZE 
FDNY’S VALUE AS INTELLIGENCE GATHERERS 
According to the FDNY, intelligence has a place in all three of its missions: 
prevention, preparedness, and response. The FDNY’s reliance on intelligence gathering is 
evidenced by its operations. For example, the FDNY meets with other city agencies 
before major events so that they may determine which areas may be inaccessible to fire 
equipment and create an alternative emergency response plan. Also, on almost every call 
for service, information is provided to firefighters as they respond to an incident to ensure 
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they are prepared for whatever they may encounter—from dangerous chemicals to other 
potentially dangerous activities.  
Having advanced situational awareness about what may be going on allows the 
firefighters to engage in problem solving and ready themselves before they arrive on the 
scene of an incident. Intelligence gathering is something routinely associated with law 
enforcement agencies, but it is an activity that is also embedded within the New York 
City Fire Department’s “DNA.” 
In addition to being aware of the FDNY’s capacity to collect intelligence, the 
NYPD must also recognize its access to information. The New York City Fire 
Department is the largest fire department in the world. Its firefighters respond to more 
than two million calls for service each year, and they routinely enter locations without the 
need for a search warrant. These calls can be anything from routine building inspections, 
to arson investigations, to responses to fire and medical emergencies. They also inspect 
and catalogue premises storing hazardous materials. While performing these inspections, 
members often carry equipment designed to detect the hazardous materials that could be 
used to create a “dirty bomb.” There are case studies demonstrating how important 
firefighters’ access can be. 
For example, Bryan Heirston describes an incident during which a firefighter 
provided intelligence that led to the creation of a Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Terrorist case.79 The firefighter, who received hazardous material training, responded to a 
simple and routine call for a “smoke condition.” However, when inspecting the scene, the 
firefighter recognized that the materials present were intended for bomb making. Law 
enforcement would have had no cause to enter the location, and the malicious intent of 
the property owner was only discovered because a 911 call for fire service was made, and 
the responding firefighter had received advanced hazardous material training. When the 
FBI conducted its investigation, additional bomb making materials, New York City maps, 
and train schedules were discovered.  
79 Bryan Heirston, “Terrorism Prevention and Firefighters: Where Are the Information Sharing 
Boundaries” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), accessed March 20, 2013, 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/4930/09Mar_Heirston.pdf?sequence=1. 
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Although it is critical that law enforcement work closely with firefighters in 
matters of intelligence gathering, it is also just as important to ensure that the firefighters 
do not “blur the lines” and transition from trained observers to active investigators in the 
course of their daily operations. Civil libertarians have raised concerns about the 
ramifications of fire departments adapting similar missions to their counterparts in law 
enforcement. One such opponent of the fire service engaging in information gathering 
and sharing is the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The ACLU cites the Fourth 
Amendment as the main reason to object to such actions. This amendment guarantees 
citizens protections against unreasonable search and seizures of their premises.80 The fire 
service enjoys a relationship with the public where firefighters are more readily granted 
access to peoples’ private homes and businesses. If they become trained agents of law 
enforcement, the public would become more suspicious and may be reluctant to call 
when they need their services.  
Thus, the primary mission of firefighters should always remain the protection of 
life and property—they must never be held by the public as an extension of law 
enforcement. However, maintaining this primary mission does not stand in contradiction 
to simply asking firefighters to carefully observe their surroundings as they enter 
locations. Consider that New York City asks the same of all its citizens with the “If You 
See Something, Say Something” public service announcement campaign. Firefighters 
need only be trained in terrorism pre-cursors and be asked to do nothing more than pass 
qualifying information directly to law enforcement.  
The New York City Fire Department has already begun training its members to 
act in this capacity. The department conducts classes in identifying suspicious behavior 
and recognizing what might be indicators of terrorist planning. In doing so, it has used 
faculty from the United States Military Academy to educate fire and EMS officers about 
the threat terrorists pose to first responders, and they are taught which hazardous 
materials are associated with terrorism.81  
80 Gartenstein-Ross and Dabruzzi, “Firefighters’ Developing Role in Counterterrorism.” 
81 Fire Department New York, FDNY Strategic Plan 2011–2013. 
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However, there is still no mechanism for information sharing. Rarely is any 
information passed along to be acted upon; usually “it slips through the cracks” because 
the FDNY practice of passing information to local law enforcement is done on an ad-hoc 
basis. Specifically, any reports of suspicious activity are forwarded through a chain of 
command and evaluated at every level to determine merit. Information may ultimately 
reach the two fire marshalls assigned to the FBI’s Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF). But 
even if it does, and the Fire Marshalls transmit the data to the FBI, there is no guarantee it 
will receive follow-up—the FBI will only follow-up on information that has a direct 
nexus to terrorism.82 After all, the FBI does not have the resources to respond to every 
local complaint.  
Intelligence about activities that do not rise to the level of criminality is supposed 
to be rerouted to the NYPD, and if this occurs, it is usually with a significant time delay. 
This is a missed opportunity for the NYPD and the FDNY to deal directly with each other 
and share information. A piece of intelligence that may initially appear to have no nexus 
to terrorism may, in fact, be proven to do so after follow-up. But right now this follow-up 
is not happening. Intelligence sharing could also have secondary benefits because even if 
the intelligence transmitted from the FDNY to the NYPD is not connected to terrorism, it 
may reveal vital details about chronic conditions that plague communities (e.g., guns, 
drugs, human trafficking). 
Put simply, the lack of information sharing is occurring because the NYPD has 
yet to recognize firefighters’ value as intelligence gatherers. But this thesis has 
demonstrated that the FDNY has the capacity to collect intelligence, the access to critical 
information, and the training in place to teach their members what to look for. Thus, the 
mindset of the NYPD brass must change. Of course, once it does, and police executives 
recognize firefighters’ value as intelligence gatherers, the question remains: how, 
82 John Flynn, “Terrorism Information Management within the New York City Fire Department: Past, 





                                                 
specifically, do we keep vital information from “slipping through the cracks” as the 
agencies begin to collaborate?  
Of course, recognizing FDNY’s values as intelligence gatherers is as much of an 
aim as it is a recommendation, but it is and aim that must be met before the following two 
recommendations, which involve operational changes, can be implemented (i.e., this 
recommendation is a precondition for the next two). How can the NYPD make progress 
towards this goal? First, more joint training would help familiarize NYPD personnel with 
their FDNY counterparts. This joint training would begin with cross-briefings for 
academy recruits and should be continued at all levels with programs like “NYPD-FDNY 
executive retreats.” Second, the NYPD should request better access to the Coordinated 
Building Inspection and Data Analysis System so the agency can witness first-hand the 
quantity and variety of information the FDNY collects. To encourage the FDNY to grant 
this access, the NYPD could simply allow the FDNY better access to the Lower 
Manhattan Security Initiative—this act of “good will” would not only help familiarize 
NYPD personnel with their FDNY counterparts, but it would also promote firefighter 
safety and create goodwill between the agencies.  
C. RECOMMENDATION 3: THE NYPD MUST IDENTIFY LIAISONS 
TO COLLABORATE WITH THE FDNY 
The NYPD has a robust and reliable mechanism in place to collect and transmit 
intelligence internally. It is a system that embeds intelligence collectors and analysts with 
the frontline first responders. These “field intelligence officers” are tasked with 
collecting, analyzing, and sharing intelligence. See Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.  FIO Defined 
The field intelligence officer, with his or her direct access to precinct, Detective 
Bureau, and Intelligence Division resources, is the ideal individual for liaising with the 
fire department on a local level. The FDNY “battalion chief” is the rough rank equivalent 
of a NYPD precinct commander—a local executive who is generally well aware of the 
issues and observations of the first responders assigned to him. Having FIOs open lines 
of communication with the battalion chiefs will “plug in” the many firehouses to the 
NYPD intelligence network. It is unlikely that the FDNY would object to having to 
provide notice to law enforcement regarding possible terrorist or criminal activity. The 
uniformed firefighters, company officers, and chief officers in New York City are peace 
officers under New York State criminal procedure law, with power to make warrantless 
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arrests, to use physical force and deadly physical force in making an arrest or preventing 
an escape, and to carry out warrantless searches whenever such searches are 
constitutionally permissible and acting pursuant to their special duties. New York City 
fire marshals have full police officer powers, including search, arrest, and the obligatory 
carrying of a firearm. Put simply, routine, official meetings between FIO’s and battalion 
chiefs should not create a labor issue because of the law enforcement powers afforded to 
members of the FDNY.83 
The mechanism would be simple: in the event that suspicious activities are noted 
by a firefighter, a standard suspicious activity report (SAR) would be prepared and 
brought to a battalion chief for immediate review and action. Battalion chiefs would 
notify FIOs of intelligence collected and e-mail them the SARs as necessary. If search 
warrant was necessary for evidentiary searches or seizures, the FIO would process the 
search warrant application with the firefighter as a “witness in hand.” 
To foster this relationship, the FIO should meet with the battalion chief regularly. 
The meeting will occur either at the local firehouse or at the precinct concerned. These 
meetings should be to exchange information and ensure open lines of communication not 
to address operational issues or complaints. Any operational issues can be addressed 
between the precinct commanders and the local battalion chiefs. See Figure 2 as an 
illustration of the NYPD FIO and FDNY information and intelligence sharing.  
83 NY State Criminal Procedure Law “Police Officer, Police Officer Definition,” Sec 1.20 #34 sub (i), 
New York State Criminal Procedure Law.  
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Figure 2.  Information/Intelligence Sharing Model 
D. RECOMMENDATION 4: THE NYPD SHOULD ESTABLISH 
LOCAL COLLABORATIVE HUBS IN COOPERATION WITH 
THE FDNY 
As a result of examining the collaborative efforts of the NYPD and FDNY, we 
already know that the agencies’ “top brass” are collaborating. The recommendation that 
NYPD field intelligence officers liaise with FDNY battalion chiefs creates collaborative 
relationship between the respective agencies’ “boots on the ground.” However, what 
about the middle management—those executives who represent a vital link between the 
upper management and the field personnel? In each department, these are the executives 
that work at a borough level and have the authority to command and mobilize significant 
local resources, be it 1,000 cops or 500 firefighters. Figure 3 gives a description of an 
NYPD patrol borough is.  
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 Figure 3.  NYPD Patrol Borough Defined 
Each patrol borough in the NYPD maintains an “operations unit” that is staffed 
around the clock, every day of the year. These operations units track every significant 
incident that happens in the patrol borough and immediately relay the information to the 
mid-level executives that oversee the borough. They also develop plans for all major 
events, including details, rallies, protests, parades, and celebrations. These events may be 
planned or unplanned at any of the precincts located within the borough. 
It is recommended that the patrol borough operations units be expanded and 
transformed into “local collaboration hubs” where FDNY personnel, in the rank of 
lieutenant or captain, would also be assigned. This rank would put them on par with their 
NYPD supervisory counterparts in the patrol borough operations units (i.e., sergeant and 
lieutenant). The FDNY supervisors would report directly deputy assistant chiefs, who 
would be the FDNY equivalent of NYPD patrol borough commanders. 
The FDNY personnel assigned to the collaboration hubs would get to participate 
in the daily crime briefings and weekly strategy meetings on crime. They would become 
an integral part of planning for upcoming events, and they would be relied upon to brief 
both the mid-level executives they report to and the local firehouse commanders.  
Briefings could include notifications regarding noteworthy crimes and violence 
near the firehouses. In addition, during the briefings, the FDNY collaboration hub 
representatives could acquire information from their peers about the needs of the fire 
department for upcoming events (e.g., which streets they recommend closing for a local 
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block party so they could move equipment expeditiously in the event of an emergency). 
Furthermore, they would assist in logistical planning on a day-to-day basis while serving 
as a critical link between the middle management of the two agencies. Most importantly, 
unlike the occasional liaising between the field intelligence officers and battalion chiefs, 
the collaboration hubs would create an arrangement where constant collaboration takes 
place at the executive level.  
To be clear, this is not an arrangement where mid-level executives are in constant 
communication directly with each other; they would be communicating via a proxy—
their operations unit personnel. We must recognize that these are extraordinarily busy 
individuals, who likely will not have the time to meet daily with their counterparts from 
another agency. However, the personnel assigned to patrol borough operations constantly 
prepare briefings for these executives. It is assumed that if need be, the operations 
personnel could immediately notify the executives they report to contact their NYPD/
FDNY counterpart. 
It is the job of the field intelligence officer and battalion chief to gather 
intelligence; it would be the job of the collaboration hub to act on the intelligence 
gathered. The mid-level executives would create operational responses to information 
transmitted to them (e.g., an elevated “terror alert level” would result in the collaboration 
hub planning for the assignment of additional personnel to high value targets in the patrol 
borough). 
It is also worth noting that the field intelligence officer/battalion chief’s 
collaborative success depends on the caliber of each of those two individuals. Results 
may vary by locale based on the enthusiasm of each respective collaborator. Conversely, 
the collaboration hub is a permanent measure that fosters, even forces, collaboration—no 
matter what the caliber and enthusiasm of the participants are. 
Furthermore, the collaboration hub arrangement would cost the NYPD little to 
nothing because the requisite personnel are already assigned to the patrol borough 
operations units. However, the FDNY would need to put approximately 16 supervisors in 
theses assignments.  
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To insure the success of this program, it is recommended that the FDNY assign 
the most recent promotees and get “buy in” from their personnel. It is also recommended 
that they assign their personnel during regular business hours. This is when most 
operational planning is accomplished. During late night/early morning hours, the 
operations unit functions as a notification center, simply passing incident information via 
phone or e-mail to NYPD mid-level executives. Nothing prevents NYPD personnel from 
simply making the same notifications to FDNY mid-level executives, negating the need 
for 24 hour FDNY staffing.  
The “collaborative hub model” is based on the “fusion center model,” and the 
evidence shows that fusion centers with fire department personnel assigned work. 
Washington state has been operating a fusion center since 2010. It reports that its center 
has been critical in “supporting the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-
related information between the federal government and state, local, tribal, and territorial 
(SLTT), and private sector partners.”84 Since 2008, the state of California also operates 
four regional fusion centers called Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Centers 
(RTTACs). The RTTACs serve the greater areas of northern California, Sacramento, Los 
Angeles, and San Diego. The state reports: 
California’s fusion centers foster communication and collaboration 
amongst the fire service; law enforcement; the federal homeland security 
and intelligence communities and public safety stakeholders. Appointees 
serve as the conduit through which homeland security and crime-related 
information flows from the field to the Fusion Center for assessment and 
analysis. The network also serves as the vehicle to carry actionable 
intelligence from the Fusion Center to field personnel. This information 
flow provides for increased safety and security for fire department 
personnel as well as the communities served.85 
It is important to note that the “collaboration hub” model proposed in this thesis 
for the FDNY and NYPD has a much more simple mechanism for sharing than the 
California or Washington endeavors, and it requires less agency resource commitment to 
84 “About the Fusion Liaison Program,” Washington State Fusion Center, September 25, 2012, 
accessed July 27, 2014, http://www.wsfc.wa.gov/FLO. 
85 “Terrorism Liaison Officer,” Office of the State Fire Marshall, accessed September 21, 2014, 
http://osfm.fire.ca.gov/training/terrorismliaisonofficer.php.  
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maintain. The proposed model has been scaled for an urban metropolis, and if these states 
can maintain a coalition of a dozen agencies, it should be much easier for New York City 
to maintain a coalition of two agencies. 
The collaborative hub organizational structure is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 







This thesis has examined some of the difficulties the NYPD and the FDNY 
experience in an effort to work collaboratively to keep NYC safe. Subsequent to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, “collaboration” and “information sharing” 
became buzz words in the first responder communities. That tragic day saw the horrific 
loss of thousands of lives and at the same time witnessed the greatest lifesaving rescue 
operation in our nation’s history. A review of those events highlighted that while heroism 
was in no short supply, a less than optimal cooperative response effort by NYC’s two 
leading first responder agencies the NYPD and the FDNY needed to be addressed. The 
individual acts of first responders were in the greatest traditions of the police and fire 
services of the city. However, many of the breakdowns in communication, coordination, 
and collaboration that may have hindered organizational performance on that day 
stemmed from long, deep-rooted histories, which existed long before the events of 
September 11. In spite of best efforts, in many ways some of these problems continue 
today.  
While both agencies have advanced towards cooperation, collaboration, and 
increased communication in a multi-agency, all hazards environment, there is still much 
more to accomplish. The NYPD has become a formidable example of the best practices 
of domestic preparedness, counter-terrorism law enforcement, threat mitigation, and 
intelligence collection, by the creation of its own counter-terrorism bureau and increase 
in the analytical capacity of its intelligence apparatus, which reaches to public safety 
agencies throughout the world. The NYPD has also made inroads to the private sector, 
tapping into resources of security directors, property managers, and communications 
companies. The resources and expertise of these partners in the private sector are utilized 
to share information in increasing volume and at a greater pace than ever before. The 
most important aspect of this public-private partnership is NYPD opening up the lines of 
communication and sharing information with other stakeholders as well as receiving 
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information willingly. The “need to share,” as the 9/11 Commission admonished,86 has 
allowed the private sector to become the force multiplier necessary, especially in austere 
times. 
Similarly, the FDNY has advanced by increasing the use of emerging technology 
and initiating regular communication and information sharing with fire service agencies 
outside of NYC. Additionally, the FDNY has increased outreach and efforts to not only 
share information with federal law enforcement, but to partner with federal law 
enforcement and other agencies to develop coordinated, combined responses to critical 
incidents, increase the fire service participation in the JTTF, and attempt to partner with 
DHS in developing intelligence sources. Unfortunately, there have been limited 
improvements in communication between the NYPD and FDNY.  
The OEM was tasked with addressing some of the coordination and incident 
management issues. These efforts have been successful to a degree, with CIMS protocols 
as a part of incident response for over a decade, and the execution of numerous, 
coordinated, major joint training exercises. A review of pertinent literature reveals a 
number of detractors. The directed efforts of the OEM are practical and effective on the 
organizational level, bringing agency heads and high level commanders together while 
addressing the larger issues; however, the current training does not fully address day to 
day operations, the first level coordination, and sharing of information. 
The thesis recognizes the advances made by both the NYPD and FDNY, and it 
has reviewed the coordination throughout New York state, specifically in a comparable 
jurisdiction outside of NYC. The comparative review highlights the progress made by 
first responders in NYC while at the same time exposing the gap and disconnection in 
interagency coordination and information sharing by those elements of each agency that 
are boots on the ground during both critical incidents and seemingly routine calls. The 
recommendations offered present operational changes that may be employed by the 
NYPD and FDNY. The recommendations are prefaced with the caveat that there is an 
86 National Commission for the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Heroism and Horror,” in 
Final Report of the National Commission for the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2004). 
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absolute need to formalize a system to share information and create an apparatus to pass 
timely and accurate intelligence between agencies, noting the need for such lines of 
communication as an organizational imperative for both agencies.  
Some of the same lack of collaboration between the FDNY and NYPD noted in 
the 9/11 Commission report still persists today. It has not been simply remedied by the 
implementation of the programs/constructs as they exist today (e.g., the Citywide 
Incident Command System). Presently, however, there is a real opportunity for 
meaningful change to be affected. New York City has a new mayor, who has appointed 
new but thoroughly experienced police, fire and OEM commissioners, each with sterling 
reputations. These individuals have the monumental task of keeping the city safe but 
must be unafraid of drastic reform. The hazards of the present are of a most difficult 
nature and in need or direct, coordinated, and collaborative response by first responders. 
The present needs of the public and of the public safety agencies are at a crossroads, 
requiring smarter, more efficient and more focused action. In adopting the 
recommendations proposed for evaluation in this thesis, the increased communication 
and coordination of efforts would provide a framework for collaboration, which would 
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